We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions.
Introduction
The labor market for politicians is unlike that of most occupations: salaries are determined through legislation rather than market forces and politicians vie for a fixed number of positions through public competition, facing the possibility of dismissal only once each electoral cycle. Since politicians' salaries are a policy variable, it is particularly important to identify the role that financial compensation plays in their labor supply. Moreover, given the visible nature of their duties, the lack of direct supervision, and the public goods aspect of their jobs, it is also critical to understand how social norms affect politicians' behavior while they are in office.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of both salary and social norms on the labor supply of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We examine three aspects of politicians' labor supply: (i) the extensive margin (the willingness to run for office), (ii) the intensive margin (effort exerted while in office), and (iii) selection effects (quality of elected candidates).
Our main source of identification is a recent change in the way that MEP salaries are determined. 1 all MEPs receive an identical salary of roughly €90,000. For some MEPs (e.g., those from Italy) this change induced a large reduction in salary, while for others (e.g., those from Hungary and Spain), it meant a big raise. At the same time, MEPs are drawn from a heterogeneous mix of nations, which allows us to examine the supply of politicians as a function not only of income, but of home-country norms as well. We can thus compare the effects of pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations of politicians.
We measure the extensive margin of labor supply in three ways. First, we examine whether incumbent MEPs seek reelection. Second, we look at whether MEPs quit before completing their terms of office. Third, we identify the number of parties that field a candidate. 2 We generate two primary measures of the intensive margin of labor supply: the rate of absences from plenary sessions, and a more direct proxy for shirking based on instances when an MEP signs the attendance register (thus collecting a daily stipend) but fails to cast a single vote. Finally, we examine quality of elected MEPs, as proxied by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions.
Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability she runs for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. Moreover, an increase in salary substantially reduces the likelihood that an MEP will quit before the end of her term. All of these results suggest that monetary remuneration plays an important role in the willingness to hold political office. One one hand, these results may not be surprising -higher salaries attract more applicants in other industries, so why should this not be the case in politics? But, as we note at the outset, politicians' labor supply may be governed by distinct forces. Both non-pecuniary motivations and the role of post-political employment are such that salary might be of secondary importance relative to other returns to holding office (see Diermeier et al. 2005 , who argue that this is the case in the U.S. Congress). 3 We do not find evidence that an increase in salary impacts the intensive margin of labor supply.
In contrast, we find a strong effect of non-pecuniary factors on whether MEPs exert effort while they are in office. We use cross-sectional variation in corruption as a proxy for the strength of home-country social capital and find that MEPs from more corrupt countries are more likely to be absent from all votes on a given day. As well as indulging in more absences, MEPs from more corrupt countries also exhibit a more explicit form of shirking. Each day they are present at the 2 Many countries in the European Union use closed-list voting systems where citizens cast votes for parties rather than individual candidates. Consequently, we are not able to identify the number of individual candidates willing to run for office in each country. 3 In interpreting our estimates, it is important to note that the elasticity of labor supply will in general depend on the existence of substitute career options, and in our context, there is a political position that may be a reasonably close substitute to being an MEP, namely serving in the home-country parliament. Consequently, the impact of salary on the supply of political candidates may be somewhat lower in other settings. parliament, MEPs are meant to sign a register to prove their attendance, entitling them to a daily allowance of roughly €300. 4 MEPs have sometimes abused this system, showing up only to sign the register. Such behavior has been a source of scandal. In 2004, for example, Austrian MEP Hans-Peter Martin filmed other MEPs signing the register shortly after 7am and then immediately leaving the building. His footage was widely broadcast and caused a public uproar. 5 Combining data from the daily register with roll-call voting data, we identify for each MEP any days on which she signed the register but was then absent from all votes that day. We find that a one standard deviation increase in corruption in an MEP's place of origin is associated with a 16 percent increase in this form of shirking.
Finally, we examine the impact of the salary change on the composition of elected officials.
Doubling the salary decreases the probability that an elected MEP attended a college ranked among the top 500 in the world by 4.2 percentage points, or 14 percent. 6 Moreover, a salary increase seems to attract MEPs who shirk more, but this effect is not robust to inclusion of country fixed effects. Overall, our evidence suggests that higher salaries lower the quality of elected MEPs.
The identifying assumption underlying our results on pecuniary motivations is that the timing of the salary reform is uncorrelated with other factors that would lead politicians from low-salary countries to increase their willingness to be MEPs relative to politicians from from high-salary countries. Another concern is that the reform may have been passed precisely when MEPs from low-salary countries were more likely to run for reelection and thus were particularly motivated to raise future salaries. Two sets of facts speak against this alternative explanation. First, such reverse causality could not account for the increase in the number of parties that field candidates when salaries increase. Second, we demonstrate that whether an MEP voted for or against salary harmonization is uncorrelated with whether the proposal would raise or lower her salary. 7 A large literature examines the theoretical relationship between politicians' wages, and their quality, performance, and willingness to run for office. Caselli and Morelli (2004) consider a setting 4 The size of the daily allowance changes somewhat over time. 5 See, for example, "European Elections: Martin's Travels," The Economist, June 3, 2004. 6 College selectivity is highly predictive of market productivity (Kane 1998 ). It is not immediately clear, however, whether it is also a good proxy for the quality of a politician. That said, we find that, conditional on running, selectivity of an MEP's college strongly predicts whether she will win a reelection. This patterns support our view that college selectivity is a good proxy for MEPs' quality. 7 Moreover, whether an MEP voted for or against salary harmonization is uncorrelated with whether that MEP subsequently runs for reelection.
where market and political ability are correlated, so higher wages attract candidates with greater political skill. Besley (2004) develops a model where higher wages compel politicians to care more about reelection; an increase in wages thus induces politicians to cater more to voters' preferences while in office. Higher wages, however, might also create negative selection effects, as our results suggest to be the case. New Hampshire has deliberately kept legislators' salaries at $100 for their 45 days in session each year (with no per diem), reasoning that this system attracts a more committed "citizen" legislature. Directly in line with this rhetoric, Besley (2004) discusses how the existence of non-pecuniary incentives for "public spirited" candidates might cause higher wages to attract less attractive candidates. Poutvaara and Takalo (2007), Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) , and Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2010) consider models where high-ability people self-select into politics; consequently, higher wages lower the ability threshold at which potential candidates decide to seek office. 8 In contrast to theoretical work, there is a relative paucity of empirical research on the labor market for elected officials, owing in large part to the difficulty in credibly identifying a relationship between pay and the supply of politicians. Outside of politics, one can often use exogenous shocks to labor demand to identify the elasticity of labor supply, but this approach is not feasible in studying the labor supply of politicians. Moreover, since salaries are typically set by those currently in office, it is usually difficult to rule out the possibility that politicians' skill affects their salaries rather than vice versa. A pair of recent papers overcome these difficulties by exploiting discontinuities of politicians' salaries in population size: Ferraz and Finan (2010) and Gagliarducci and Nannicini (forthcoming) examine the impact of wages on labor supply and performance of Brazilian municipal legislators and Italian mayors, respectively, and find that higher wages attract more candidates and higher quality candidates in both contexts. Ferraz and Finan (2010) also find evidence that higher wages induce higher effort, while Gagliarducci and Nannicini (forthcoming) find this channel to be unimportant. Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) study the effect of a wage increase in the Finnish National Parliament. Using candidates in municipal elections as a control group, they report that the wage increase led to more educated female candidates but had no effect on the composition 8 Messner and Polborn (2004) study a model where candidates are motivated to run in part because they care about political duties being executed effectively. In this setting, higher wages can decrease the quality of elected officials since higher wages allow skilled individuals to more easily free-ride on participation of others.
of male candidates. Di Tella and Fisman (2004) present evidence that better state-level economic performance allows U.S. governors to push up their own salaries, while Besley (2004) finds that U.S.
governors' salaries increase when their policies are congruent with voter preferences. Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994) and Hall and van Houweling (1995) report that U.S. congressmen respond to changes in the financial incentives for retirement. The structural estimation exercise of Keane and Merlo (2010) suggests that a reduction in congressional salaries in the U.S. would disproportionally induce exit of skilled politicians.
Closest to the context we explore in our paper is the concurrent work by Mocan and Altindag (2011) . They also study the impact of social norms and salaries on the behavior of MEPs. However, they only examine the impact of these factors on whether MEPs sign the daily register, while we focus on a broader set of outcomes (the willingness to run for reelection, quality of MEPs, number of parties that field a candidate, absence from roll-call votes, and so forth). 9 Moreover, in contrast to their findings, we do not find that the salary change has a significant impact on the tendency to sign the daily register. We replicate their point estimate, which is quite small, and when we cluster our standard errors at the country level, 10 the effect is not statistically significant.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a more complete view of politicians' labor supply -in our setting, we can examine the impact of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors, measure both the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply, and also identify selection effects. Furthermore, in contrast to most earlier work, the European Parliament wage equalization provides us with a credible source of identification of the impact of salary changes.
Finally, some of the outcomes we analyze, such as the supply of political parties, have not been studied at all in previous work.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the data and the institutional background. Section 3 presents the results. The last section concludes. 9 Along with the impact of social norms and the salary change, Mocan and Altindag (2011) also examine the impact of the changes in the daily allowance. These changes, however, have no cross-sectional variation and are thus identified solely off from the time trend. 10 Mocan and Altindag (2011) cluster their standard errors at the MEP level.
Data and institutional background
The European Parliament is the lower legislative chamber of the European Union. MEPs, and (ii) only 33 MEPs exercised the option to retain the old national salaries. 13 We have been able to identify only 5 of these 33 MEPs, so we cannot exclude all MEPs with unchanged salaries from our analyses. That said, they comprise less than 5 percent of the sample, so their effect on our estimates is likely to be small. Moreover, since their salaries did not actually change, they are likely to bias our estimates toward zero.
The data employed in this paper are derived from a number of sources. We obtained data on The measures of the extensive margin of labor supply are constructed using data available on 13 At first glance it might seem surprising that MEPs who received a pay cut would not elect to keep their old salaries. Doing so, however, would require transferring the burden of payment from the European Parliament to the taxpayers of one's own country, which might not be popular with the electorate. More broadly, many legislative bodies have the legal power to raise their own salaries and yet seldom choose to do so.
14 We also considered the tax-adjusted salary change, using the top marginal tax rate in the home country. Since the tax rates are uncorrelated with initial salaries, this alternative measure yields very similar results.
the web pages of the European Parliament. 15 For EP6 and EP7, for each MEP who served in the previous parliament, we define a variable ReRun ip that indicates whether she ran for reelection (i indexes the MEP and p indexes the parliament). 16 For EP5 and EP6, for each MEP who served in that parliament, we define an indicator variable P ostV oteQuit ip which equals 1 if MEP i quit her job before completing her term at some point after June 23rd of the second calendar year of parliament p. For p = 6, this indicates that the MEP quit the parliament at some point after the vote on the salary change. For p = 5, this indicates she quit the parliament during the same segment of the electoral cycle but in the parliamentary session prior to the introduction of salary change legislation. Finally, for EP6 and EP7, for each member country, we collected data on the number of parties that fielded a candidate, taken from the European Parliament's website. 17 The available data only include parties that received at least 0.5% of the vote. 18 Accordingly, we define lnN umP arties cp as the logarithm of the number of parties in country c that received at least 0.5% of the vote for candidacy to parliament p. These three variables, ReRun ip , P ostV oteQuit ip , and lnN umP arties cp , will be our measures of the extensive margin of labor supply.
Building on a previous data collection effort by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007), we also put together comprehensive data on attendance and roll-call voting in the daily sittings of EP5, EP6, and the first year of EP7. 19 As mentioned previously, a sitting is a day-long meeting of the parliament during which roll-call voting takes place. For each sitting, our data contain information about whether each serving MEP signed the attendance register and how she voted (if at all) on the issues that day. 20 We focus on attendance and voting records during the first year of each 16 These data are missing for 16 observations. 17 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/new_parliament_en.html and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/hist_results_be_en.html accessed in July 2009. 18 In many countries there are often small parties that obtain less than 0.5% of the vote. We must exclude those simply because we do not have data on their participation in elections for the European Parliament. In the best case scenario, this exclusion is desirable because parties that are so small do not have a real impact on the political equilibrium. In the worst case scenario, this exclusion is a source of classical measurement error.
19 Data on voting and attendance in the plenaries of EP6 and EP7 was collected from the published daily minutes on the European Parliament website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/plenary/home.do?language=EN, between February 2007 and October 2010. We also collected data on attendance in EP5 which we combined with voting information from the Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007) data (downloaded in November 2007). 20 The published minutes of the meetings also contain information on so-called vote corrections where an MEP asks parliament, to avoid comparing behaviors across different points in the electoral cycle and further to concentrate on behavior during the period of EP6 that occurred before the salary vote. We are also interested in the impact of salary change on the selection of politicians. We use global rankings of colleges attended by MEPs as a measure of MEP quality. From MEPs' individual websites, we identified where each attended college. We were able to obtain this information for nearly 90 percent of the sample. We merged these data with the 2010 Academic Ranking of World Universities, which provides a rank for the top 500 universities in the world. 21 The variable F ractionRankedCollege cp is the fraction of MEPs from country c in parliament p who attended a school ranked in the top 500. 22 Most MEPs attend college in their home country, and countries vary to have her registered vote changed in the minutes (without affecting the actual outcome). In our empirical work we focus on the pre-correction voting outcome but results are robust to considering corrected votes instead. There are also some instances of secret ballot votes in the data, where each MEP's vote is not made public. For these it is still recorded whether each MEP voted. 21 Since rankings might change somewhat over time, it would have been more suitable to utilize the rank of a school at the time when the MEP attended it, but the available data only go back to 2003 and many MEPs have been out of college for more than seven years. 22 For our main specification, we simply drop the 10 percent of MEPs without education data and treat the widely in their universities' representation in the ranking. Consequently, F ractionRankedCollege cp is not particularly useful for identifying cross-sectional variation in the quality of MEPs across countries, but it does capture the change in quality of MEPs from a given country over time. 
Impact of salary and social norms on labor supply and selection of MEPs
As we mentioned earlier, in the past MEPs received the same salary as members of the lower house of their own national parliament. during the 6th parliament. 23 Starting with EP7, which began in July 2009, salaries were equalized for all MEPs. Our empirical strategy for estimating the impact of salary change on labor supply is based on the assumption that the timing of this salary change is uncorrelated with a change in omitted variables that would differentially influence the labor supply of MEPs from countries that initially had low and high salaries.
To identify the impact of social capital on labor supply, we rely on the cross-sectional variation in corruption across countries. We take a broad interpretation of this country-level measure as reflecting values of public service over private gain.
Extensive margin of labor supply
Our first specification examines the impact of the salary change on the willingness of incumbent
MEPs to seek reelection. We consider a linear probability model: 24
where p ∈ {6, 7}. The sample consists of all MEPs who served in EP5, and those MEPs who served in EP6 and joined the parliament prior to the announcement of the salary change. 25 EP 7 p is an indicator variable for whether p = 7. ReRun ip denotes whether MEP i ran for reelection for parliament p, and ∆lnSalary c is the salary change instituted at the beginning of EP7, defined in the previous section. For this specification, as for all others, we report robust standard errors that are clustered by country. Given the small number of countries in our data, however, we have also assessed the statistical significance of all coefficients of interest using bootstrap methods that are robust to the presence of few clusters. 26 Boostrap-based results were virtually identical to those presented except where noted in the text.
Coefficient β 1 captures the cross-sectional relationship between the salary in EP6 and the will-ingness of MEPs who served in EP5 to run for reelection for EP6. Since ∆lnSalary c is defined as a constant minus log of salary in EP6, a negative β 1 indicates a positive cross-sectional relationship between salary and the extensive margin of labor supply. Coefficient β 2 tells us whether, in the absence of a salary change, MEPs are overall more likely to run for reelection for EP7 or for EP6.
The main coefficient of interest is β 3 , which identifies the impact of the salary change on willingness to run for reelection.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the results without controls. list system, a candidate directly chooses to run while in a closed-list system she needs her party's approval to do so. In Figure 1 , we plot the change in the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection against ∆lnSalary c . As the figure shows, the positive relationship between the two variables is not driven by extreme observations, nor by countries with a particular electoral system.
Column (2) of Table 3 adds country by EP controls (lnGDP P C cp and Corruption cp ) to Equation 1. These variables are measured in the last year of parliament p − 1, i.e., at the time when the MEP was likely making the decision of whether to run for reelection. Column (3) adds MEP by EP controls (Age ip , AgeSq ip , and lnT enure ip ), also measured in the last year of parliament p − 1. Column (4) adds country fixed effects. The estimate of our key coefficient of interest, β 3 , is stable across these four specifications. 27 The estimate in column (4), which contains our preferred specification, implies that a doubling of MEP salary increases the likelihood of rerunning by 23
percentage points.
A somewhat stronger way to express diminished interest in serving as an MEP is to quit before the term expires. In Table 4 , we consider a linear probability model:
where p ∈ {5, 6} and EP 6 p is an indicator variable for whether p = 6. Recall that P ostV oteQuit ip equals 1 if MEP i quit her job before completing her term at some point after June 23rd of the second calendar year of parliament p. For p = 6, this indicates quitting the parliament after the vote on the salary change. For p = 5, this indicates quitting the parliament during the same segment of the electoral cycle, but in the parliamentary session before the salary change had been introduced. As in Table 3 , Column (1) reports the baseline results, Column (2) adds country by EP controls, Column (3) adds MEP by EP controls, and Column (4) adds country fixed effects.
The estimate of our key coefficient of interest, β 3 , changes somewhat across the specifications, but it is always negative and is statistically significant when we include MEP by EP controls and/or country fixed effects, our preferred specifications. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that a lower salary increases the likelihood that an MEP will quit her job before completing her term of office. 27 We also ran a specification that included the 2007-2009 change in lnGDP P Ccp interacted with EP 7 as a control, to account for possible effects of the financial crisis on the decision to run for reelection. This had no effect on the coefficients of interest in Table 3 , or those in Table 4 below. Tables 3 and 4 Table 5, we consider OLS specifications of the form:
The results in
where p ∈ {6, 7}. As Column (1) Table 5 we add country by EP controls, and in Column (3) we add country fixed effects. The estimate of β 3 is significant in each of the three specifications (when employing booststrap-based inference instead of standard clustered standard errors, however, β 3 is significant only at the 10 percent level).
In Figure 2 , we plot the change in lnN umP arties c against ∆lnSalary c , indicating electoral system as open, closed, or ordered. As the figure shows, the positive relationship between the two variables is not driven by extreme observations. The impact of salary on the number of parties that field a candidate suggests that increasing politicians' salaries provides the electorate with a broader choice of political platforms. As empha-28 Readers familiar primarily with the political system of the United States should note that most European countries have a large number of politically active parties and some of those parties are at the margin where they might focus exclusively on national politics or might spend some of their resources vying for a greater role in European politics. At the same time, in many countries small parties focusing only on European politics (and oftentimes on a single political issue) also form to field candidates exclusively in EP elections.
29 This is somewhat different from the overall standard deviation of lnN umP arties reported in Overall, our three measures of the extensive margin of labor supply, ReRun ip , P ostV oteQuite ip , and lnN umP arties cp , suggest that the salary associated with a political office has a substantial impact on the number of candidates willing to hold that office.
Intensive margin of labor supply
In this subsection, we study the effect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives on the intensive margin of labor supply. Our three measures, F ractionAbsent ip , F ractionSignedIn ip , and F ractionSignedInAbsent ip , are defined in Section 2. We begin with our primary measure of the intensive margin of labor supply, F ractionAbsent ip , the fraction of sittings in parliament p during which an MEP cast no votes (abstentions are included as votes cast). In Table 6 , we consider OLS specifications of the form:
As noted above, we focus on the first year of each parliament to avoid comparing behaviors across different points in the electoral cycle and further to concentrate on behavior during the period of EP6 that occurred before the salary vote. The coefficient β 1 captures any cross-sectional relationship between pre-harmonization salaries and the tendency of MEPs to be absent. All of the estimates of β 1 are negative, but in each case, the coefficient is imprecisely estimated and 30 For a caveat, however, see Kamenica (2008) . 31 One possibility might be to use data on vote shares to estimate the fraction of the electorate whose preferred choice is a new party whose participation was induced by higher salaries, but this approach is not feasible since in many countries there is substantial entry and exit of parties that participate in European politics.
32 This is analogous to standard arguments in industrial organization. Even if few consumers buy products from a new entrant, the entry can increase consumer welfare by lowering the prices of incumbent firms.
statistically insignificant. Estimates of β 2 are also negative but insignificant.
The point estimates on the main coefficient of interest, β 3 , are positive and insignificant. In some specifications, the positive estimate is close to conventional significance, but when we include country fixed effects, the estimated coefficient drops to 0.00, with a standard error of 0.019. Thus, while specifications with sparse controls might suggest that higher salary decreases effort, our preferred specification implies that salary change has no effect. Moreover, as we shall discuss below, any impact of salary on effort is likely to be driven by selection effects.
We now turn to the impact of salary on F ractionSignedIn ip , the fraction of days an MEP signed the daily register in parliament p. We include this specification primarily so we can relate our analysis to the existing literature; as we mentioned earlier, this outcome measure is difficult to interpret since it conflates effort (showing up to work) and greed (signing the register even if you are not going to work). In Table 7 , we consider OLS specifications of the form:
In Column (1), we report the coefficients from the regression in Equation (5) . Column (2) adds country by time period controls. Column (3) adds MEP by time period controls. Column (4) adds country fixed effects. In a concurrent paper, Mocan and Altindag (2011) also explore how salary changes induced by the reform in the European Parliament affected the tendency of MEPs to sign the register. Our specification is somewhat different from theirs, but it reveals roughly the same pattern. Like Mocan and Altindag (2011), we find a small negative point estimate on β 3 . Our estimates are similar in magnitude to those of Mocan and Altindag (2011), but we find a far lower level of statistical significance, presumably because we cluster our standard errors by country.
Finally, we examine the behavior that was at the root of the scandals we discussed in the introduction: the tendency of MEPs to sign the register and then immediately leave the building.
Recall that F ractionSignedInAbsent ip is defined as the fraction of those sittings in year t when MEP i signed the register but cast zero votes. In Table 8 , we consider an OLS specification of the form:
None of the coefficients of interest, β 1 through β 3 , is significant in any specification.
Coefficient β 3 in Tables 6 and 8 captures the overall impact (or lack there of) of salary change on the intensive margin of labor supply. These coefficients, however, reflect both a treatment effect (the impact on the MEPs who are in office) and a potential selection effect (the change in the type of MEPs that hold office). In Table 9 , we try to disentangle these two effects. In Panel A, we repeat the analyses of Tables 6 and 8 This pattern suggests that, to the extent that there is any impact of salary on the intensive margin of labor supply at all, 33 it stems from a higher salary attracting MEPs who exert less effort rather than from a change in the effort of incumbent MEPs. We further examine the selection effects induced by the salary change in the next subsection.
One possible reason for the limited impact of salaries on the intensive margin is that politicians' motivations to exert effort while in office may be dominated by non-pecuniary considerations. In particular, the desire to perform one's public duty combined with the fear of social sanction may prevent shirking. Following the approach in Fisman and Miguel (2007), we use corruption as a proxy for a country's social norms. Looking back at Tables 6-8, we observe that home-country corruption is consistently associated with lower attendance: MEPs from more corrupt countries are more likely to be absent from roll-call votes; they are less likely to sign the daily register; and conditional on signing the register, they are more likely to be absent. The estimates are large in magnitude. For example, the point estimate on corruption in Table 8 (Column 2) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the corruption level of an MEP's home country increases 33 Note that β3 is not significant in any specification once we include country fixed effects.
F ractionSignedInAbsent ip (evaluated at the sample mean of 8.0 percent) by about 16 percent.
It is worth noting that our results on corruption are identified from cross-sectional variation; unsurprisingly, when we include country fixed effects, the impact of corruption is inconsistent in magnitude and significance, as within-country variation in corruption ratings is essentially noise. 34
In contrast, we take advantage of a plausibly exogenous salary change to identify the sensitivity of MEP behavior to financial incentives. Hence, our evidence on the effects of social norms may be more vulnerable to omitted variable bias. That said, the coefficient on corruption remains very stable in magnitude and significance as we include additional covariates. This stability suggests that if the observable characteristics in our data are representative of the unobservables, omitted variable bias is unlikely to drive our results (Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005).
Quality of MEPs
The fact that higher wages induce more individuals to seek a political office does not by itself imply that the quality of elected officials will increase. In fact, as discussed in the introduction, there are several theoretical models which suggest that a higher salary may lower the quality of candidates and elected politicians. Moreover, Table 9 presented suggestive evidence that higher salary attracts
MEPs that are more prone to absenteeism and shirking.
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of the salary change on the quality of elected MEPs as proxied by the global rankings of the undergraduate institutions they attended. Many studies have found that individuals who attend more selective colleges have greater permanent income. For example, Kane (1998) shows that, in the United States, attending a college with a 100 point higher average SAT is associated with 3 to 7 percent higher earnings later in life. 35 Hence, MEPs who attended a more selective college are likely to be more productive workers, and as long as market skill is positively correlated with political skill, this would also mean they are likely to be more effective politicians. Moreover, college selectivity of an MEP strongly predicts reelection conditional on rerunning -a pattern that 34 Note that estimates are significant at least at the 5 percent level in all columns without country fixed effects. When bootstrap-based inference is employed, however, significance is generally slightly lower in all specifications, with some estimates in Table 9 significant only at the 10 percent level.
35 Most of the literature on this topic strives to disentangle the causal impact of college selectivity on future earnings from selection effects (e.g., Dale and Krueger 2002) . For our purposes, however, it does not matter whether college selectivity causes or simply predicts high permanent income.
continues to hold if we include country fixed effects and/or controls for other MEP characteristics. 36 This correlation further supports our view that college selectivity is a good proxy for MEPs' quality, particularly in the eyes of voters.
In Section 2, we describe the construction of the variable F ractionRankedCollege cp . In Table   10 , we consider OLS specifications of the form:
In Columns (1) through (3), we simply drop the 10% of MEPs where we could not identify their undergraduate institutions. In Column (1), coefficient β 1 is imprecisely estimated. Estimate of β 2 is positive and significant (p < 0.01) which means that, net of the impact of salary change, the quality of MEPs in EP7 was greater than in EP6. The estimate of β 3 is −0.06 (p < 0.01). This implies that doubling an MEP's salary reduces the likelihood than an elected MEP attended a top university by 4.2 percentage points. Given that around 30% of MEPs overall attend a top university, this is a reduction of 14 percent. In Column (2) we include country by EP controls. The estimate of β 3 is unaffected. Column (3) includes country fixed effects. This makes the coefficient less precisely estimated, and thus no longer significant at the 5 percent level (p = 0.079). In Columns (4) through (6) we redefine our outcome variable F ractionRankedCollege cp by including all MEPs and coding those with missing education data as having gone to an unranked school.
This alternative specification slightly strengthens our results.
Overall, our results provide support for the view, emphasized by theoretical work discussed in the introduction, that higher salaries might decrease the quality of elected officials. Thus, at least in the context of the European Parliament, this negative selection effect needs to be weighed against the benefits of increased competition suggested by the results in Subsection 3.1.
Intensive margin of labor supply and election outcomes
Finally, we turn to the relationship between absenteeism and shirking, on one hand, and the likelihood that an incumbent MEP gets elected conditional on running for reelection on the other. 36 Results available on request.
In Table 11 , we consider a linear probability model:
The sample is the set of all MEPs who served in EP5 and ran for reelection for EP6 and MEPs who served in EP6 and ran for reelection for EP7. ReElected ip is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the MEP was elected to parliament p. We consider the same three measures of AttendanceRecord ip−1 as in the previous subsection, but incorporate votes in all years, since there is no clear reason to limit the sample to the first year of each parliament. In Columns (1), (3), and (5), we report the coefficients from the regressions in Equation (8) . In Columns (2), (4), and (6), we add controls for EP 7, MEP by EP controls, and country fixed effects. Across all specifications except one, we find that MEPs with better attendance records are significantly more likely to be reelected at the 5% level. The only exception is the estimate in Column (4) where the point estimate on F ractionSignedIn ip−1 is only significant at the 10% level (using bootstrap-based inference the estimates in columns (2)- (4) are significant at the 10 percent level). Of course, the results in Table 11 should be interpreted with considerable caution since we are looking at reelection results conditional on the fact that the MEP chose to run for reelection. With that caveat in mind, these results provide suggestive evidence that voters prefer MEPs who exert more effort while in office.
If this relationship between electoral success and effort is assumed to be causal, it becomes more difficult to reconcile our two earlier findings: higher salaries make the office of MEP more desirable but do not decrease shirking. It may be, however, that the increased electoral incentive is insufficient to induce higher effort, or that MEPs are myopic in their behavior between elections.
Endogeneity concerns
The validity of the analysis in the preceding subsections rests on the assumption that the timing of the change in salary regime is uncorrelated with a change in other factors that differentially affect MEPs from low-salary and high-salary countries. One concern would be that the salary equalization proposal got passed precisely when the MEPs from low-salary countries were more likely to run for reelection and thus particularly motivated to raise future salaries. There are two sets of facts that alleviate this concern. First, this explanation could not account for the increased number of parties that field a candidate when salaries increase. If anything, facing more motivated incumbents would be a deterrent that would lead to fewer challengers. Second, as we report in Table 12 , whether an MEP voted for or against salary harmonization is uncorrelated with whether the regime change would raise or lower her salary. Specifically, we let V oteF orSalaryChange i be an indicator variable for whether MEP i voted for salary harmonization and we consider a linear probability model:
Whether we consider this baseline specification (Column 1), add MEP-level controls (Column 2), or further include country-level controls (Column 3), the estimate of β 1 is small and insignificant.
Similarly, if we include V oteF orSalaryChange i as a control to any of the regressions considered above, the results are unchanged.
A separate set of concerns relate to the possibility of omitted variables that are correlated with the extent of salary change across countries and also affect our outcomes of interest. While we cannot rule out this possibility entirely, we address some concerns that could be seen as significant threats to our identification strategy. First, we examine whether any of our results are affected by the inclusion of an indicator variable denoting that a country entered the European Parliament in 2004. Plausibly, late arrivals to the European parliament behave differently from long-time members -their norms of attendance may have different trajectories and their rates of political party growth may differ. If so, since late-joining countries experienced a greater increase in salaries due to the harmonization policy, this pattern would introduce a confound. When we control for late arrival, however, none of our results are affected. Second, while we control for GDP in levels, the period we study also coincided with a global recession whose effects were felt to differing degrees across countries in Europe. When we control for the change in the log of GDP per capita between 2004 and 2009, in addition to controlling for the level of income, our results are once again unchanged.
Conclusion
We provide evidence on the impact of pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives on both the extensive and the intensive margins of politicians' labor supply. We take advantage of a unique set of circumstances -a salary reform in the European Parliament that allows for a credible identification of financial motives, and the cross-country nature of the parliament itself which provides variation in the norms of politicians' home communities. We also introduce an innovative measure of politicians'
shirking, based on signing the attendance register to collect a daily allowance, but not participating in session votes.
Our results imply that a higher salary: (i) attracts more candidates and more parties, (ii) has no substantial impact on effort exerted while in office, and (iii) reduces the quality of elected MEPs.
Meanwhile, non-pecuniary factors seem to play an important role in inducing politicians to exert effort while in office.
There are many questions raised by these results. Most obviously, it would be important to know the extent to which our set of findings would carry over to politicians in other places or other levels of government. Furthermore, while we find that home-country social norms influence the intensive margin of labor supply, we are unable to distinguish whether these norms operate through politicians' internal motivations or through social pressure from the electorate. By carefully considering how the media coverage of scandals affects MEPs' behavior, one might better understand the relative importance of these two channels. It may also be useful to understand whether political institutions such as term limits and electoral rules interact with pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives in influencing politicians' behavior. Finally, given our preliminary results on the role of selection effects in the behavior of elected MEPs, it will be important to assess the impacts of salary changes in the longer run.
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FIGURE 1 Change in Fraction of MEPs Who Ran for Reelection vs. Change in Salary
ReRun ip is an indicator variable for whether MEP i who served in parliament p -1 ran for reelection for parliament 
